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Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) is an open encryption 
and security specification designed to protect credit card 
transactions on the Internet.  SET is not itself a payment 
system, rather it is a set of security protocols and formats 
that enable users to employ existing credit card payment 
infrastructure on an open network, such as the Internet, in 
a secure fashion. In addition, recently, a great deal of 
interest has been expressed in implementing and extending 
cryptography and biometric into standard authentication 
protocols and distributed systems. This paper proposes an 
alternative authentication mechanism for supporting and 
enhancing the cardholder authentication technique used by 
SET. A cryptographic-biometric mechanism is proposed to 
offer a more secure and suitable method for 
authentication/verification of the SET participant identity. 
A software implementation of the proposed mechanism uses 
SHA-1 for message digest authentication and DSA/RSA 
approach for digital signature.  A simulated application is 
presented with results showing the advantageous features 
of the proposed mechanism and its potential for SET 
implementation. 
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With the proliferation of information exchange across 
the Internet, and the storage of sensitive data on open 
networks, cryptography is becoming an increasingly 
important feature of computer security. Many 
cryptographic algorithms are available for securing 
information. Authentication is used to determine the 
identity of a user. Authentication is a very important 
concept in security, because many critical security 
services are dependant on authenticating users. The 
integrity of authentication data is the primary security 
requirement and that confidentiality is secondary, 
even though the majority of authentication schemes 
today encrypt PINs and passwords [1].  
 
SET is designed to be used with 1,024-bit cipher 
keys, making it one of the strongest encryption in 
public use. This makes it potentially attractive for 
wide use by financial institutions and other 
applications. The SET protocol provides many 
advantages, that put together makes it safer than other 
payment methods, particularly in terms of privacy, 
integrity, and authentication. A numerous 
cryptographic algorithms are used by SET as the 
main security tools. However, the main advantage of 
the use of SET is in the use of digital certificates, 
which are used to authenticate all parties involved in 
a transaction. 
 
The success of SET is dependent on correct users 
authentication. The majority of authentication 
schemes today encrypt PINs and passwords. These 
techniques can be fooled by covert observation, theft, 
login spoofing or by traffic monitoring, and this 
jeopardizes and make vulnerable the whole concept 
of security. Cryptographic-biometric can provide an 
improved system of authentication, and it is getting 
more developed and widely used. 
 
In the SET system, Certification Authority (CA) is an 
entity that is trusted to release X.509v3 public-key 
certificates for cardholders, merchants, and payment 
gateways. The success of SET will depend on the 
existence of CA infrastructure available for this 
purpose. As indicated earlier, the majority of 
authentication schemes today used in various SET 
products are encrypting PINs and passwords to 
receive the certificate. Both methods (encrypting 
PINs and passwords) suffer from a number of 
drawbacks, limitations, and are unable to positively 
identify a person. One of the main problems with 
such approaches is that the authentication subsystem 
can be fooled relatively easily. Passwords and PINs 
can be illicitly acquired relatively easily by direct 
covert observation. Once an intruder has the 
password, he can receive the certificate and he has a 
total access to associated resource. The other major 
problem is that there is no way to positively link the 
usage of the certificate to the actual cardholder, i.e. 
the issue of “repudiation”. On the other hand, the 
users do not pay sufficient attention to wisely 
choosing passwords and PINs. The other possible 
attack is to steal a system's password and PINs file, if 
the file is not assigned the correct access protection or 
stored in encrypted from, it will be relatively easy. 
Furthermore, passwords and PINs are vulnerable to 
other number of attacks such as login spoofing and 




Today, biometric systems are being widely developed 
and deployed to provide greater security to users and 
there is an increased awareness of the value of 
biometric systems. Biometric systems-users are 
gaining experience and confidence in biometric 
systems and are beginning to reap the benefits of this 
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technology. Rapid increase in computers processing 
power and the decline in the price made the 
implementation of authentication using biometric 
features attainable. Many biometric sampling systems 
are currently available. Large databases with fast 
processors are able to authenticate, identify and enroll 
a large number of users at very high speed. Biometric 
system can be described as cost-effective, reliable and 
highly accurate [2, 3]. 
 
Instead of entering PIN or password to receive the 
digital certificates from the CA, cryptographic 
biometric-based authentication offers several useful 
advantages over knowledge and possession-based 
authentication methods. The use of this certificate is 
guarded by cryptographic-biometric authentication. 
Biometric is a technology that (uniquely) identifies a 
person based on his/her physiological or behavioral 
characteristics. One of the main advantages of 
biometrics signals is that they are much longer in size 
than a password and PINs. Moreover, It is inherently 
more reliable and more capable in differentiating 
between an authorized person and a fraudulent 
imposter, because many of physiological or 
behavioral features are distinctive to each person. 
While biometrics can help to alleviate the problem 
associated with the existing methods, hackers will 
still find the weak points in the system and attack it at 
those points (however, biometrics systems require 
more effort) and at this point cryptography comes in 
the picture. So, the proposed mechanism is a 
combination of both cryptography and biometrics 
technologies. 
 
The organizations of this paper are as follows: 
Section 2 presents concise background of the 
proposed mechanism. In Section 3, we give detailed 
description for the mechanism architecture and its 
components. In Section 4, we briefly discuss and give 
a general evaluation of the proposed mechanism. In 
Section 5, we present the related work. Section 6 
provides a conclusion of this paper. 
 
2.0 THE MECHANISM BACKGROUND 
 
Hashing and Digital Signing 
SET protocol ensures data integrity by using one-way 
cryptographic hashing algorithms and digital 
signatures to make sure that the message in transit has 
not been modified in transit.  A hashing algorithm is a 
function used to calculate a unique integrity value, 
called the hash value or message digest, from the 
original data (the message). A digital signature is the 
hash value encrypted using the sender’s private key 
appended to the rest of the message.  This procedure 
ensures the integrity of the data. CA (the trusted third 
party) issues the Digital Certificates to ensure 
authenticity of transacting parties.  
 
Biometric Technology 
Biometrics identification/authentication is fast 
emerging as a reliable automated method of 
establishing the identity of a user of an automated 
system, such as an ATM customer or a computer 
user.  A biometric system is an automated system 
capable of collecting, storing, and processing 
biometric sample and comparing them to biometric 
templates. The biometric samples are data 
representation of a characteristic or measurement 
captured or scanned by a biometric device, such as 
fingerprint, voice, iris, face and/or hand. 
 
Biometric identification exploits the universally 
recognized fact that certain physiological or 
behavioral characteristics reliably distinguish one 
person from another. Biometrics includes both the 
automatic collection and the comparison of these 
characteristics. The digital representations of these 
characteristics are stored in an electronic medium and 
later used to confirm the identity of an individual. A 
typical authentication process utilizing biometric 
technology consists of the following basic steps: 
 
• Capture the biometric data.  
• Evaluate the quality of the captured biometric 
data and recapture if necessary.  
• Process the captured biometric data to create a 
biometric sample.  
• Match the biometric sample with a previously 
enrolled template, or templates, to determine if a 
match exists. This matching can be done as 
verification/authentication or identification. 
 
Accurate and automatic authentication of users is a 
fundamental problem in network environments. 
Shared secrets such as PINs or passwords and key 
devices like smart cards just are not enough in some 
cases. Cryptographic-biometric authentication offers 
a more secure and safe mechanism for that purpose. 
Instead of entering PIN or password to receive the 
digital certificates from the CA, the use of this 
certificate is guarded by cryptographic-biometric 
authentication. With proper system design and smart 
use of strong cryptography biometric authentication, 
systems can provide a better mechanism for 
authentication of SET users. 
 
3.0 THE MECHANISM  
 
The mechanism is designed to work on an open 
system, which allows a cardholder in the SET system 
receiving an X.509v3 digital certificate from a CA 
and deal with other SET participants. The mechanism 
is as follow: 
 
Let C, denotes the cardholder ID (or any SET 
participant ID in case of generalization the 
mechanism, and this ID no need to be secured but 
must be unique), T denotes the biometric template, S 
denotes the biometric sample, H denotes the hash 
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code, KR denotes the private key, and KU denotes 
the public key. 
 
In the mechanism, the cardholder IDs (i.e. C1, C2, 
…Cn) and the associated biometric templates (i.e. T1, 
T2, …Tn) are stored in a central database at the CA 
in pairs of the form (Ci, Ti). In this case, the 
mechanism protects the integrity and confidentiality 
of the stored (Ci, Ti) value; so, it proposes a 
secret/symmetric cryptography algorithm (e.g. AES) 
for encrypting the templates of authorized users, 
because in this case of large size of information, the 
faster symmetric technique is more suitable and 
efficient than public-key/asymmetric technique. 
Encrypting the biometric templates protect 
cardholders’ privacy and increase the difficulty of the 
cryptanalysis. 
 
Each cardholder, presents his ID (i.e. Ci) and the 
‘signed’ biometric sample {(i.e. KRi [H(Si)]), using 
his private key [KRi]} to the CA. The mechanism 
proposes the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for 
signing and verifying the biometric sample. Both 
pairs [Ci, Si] and the signature (KRi [H(Si)]) are then 
transmitted. The CA takes the pairs and produces a 
hash code. The CA also decrypts the signature for 
verifying, using the cardholder public key (KUi 
[H(Si)]). If the calculated hash code matches the 
decrypted signature, the signature is accepted as 
valid. Then, the CA extracts a biometric template (i.e. 
XTi) from the checked-received biometric sample 
(i.e. Si). The CA encrypts the extracted biometric 
template (i.e. XTi) and matches it’s encrypted value 
[Eki (XTi)] and the encrypted biometric template [Eki 
(Ti)] or vice versa. [Eki (Ti)] already stored in the 
central database at CA. The encryption and 
decryption are performed with the same secret key 
(ki), using the symmetric cryptography algorithm (i.e. 
AES). 
 
So, to create a ‘valid Authentication’ we assume that, 
there are (n) cardholders (where n>0) and it’s 
necessary that, at least (m) cardholders (where 
0<m<n) present valid biometric sample (Si) to the 
CA. If m valid cardholder-supplied pairs are 
presented to the CA, a ‘valid Authentication’ is 
created, and then the digital certificate is released and 
the cardholders can start dealing with other 
participant of the SET system.  
 
3.1 The Mechanism Schema 
  
1. Input device or sensor  
2. The cardholder PC + our 
software for signing biometric 
sample  
3. The software part for 
verifying. (CA verifies 
the signature) 
 
4. The software part for 
extracting (XTi) biometric 
templates 
5. The software part for matching 
Cardholder installation The CA installation 
     Central database
(Encrypted biometric 
templates of authorized 
cardholders)  
If accepted as Valid (else reject) 
Sends them to 
CA
In case, there is a 
match (else reject)Issue/release the certificate 
 
Figure 1: Main components of the proposed 
mechanism and Data-flows 
 
1. A biometric sample is first obtained from an 
input device or sensor attached to the cardholder 
PC.  
2. Each cardholder presents his ID and the ‘signed’ 
biometric sample (i.e. [Ci, Si] and (KRi [H(Si)])) 
over the network to the CA for verifying, 
extracting, and matching processes.  
3. The CA receives the pairs [Ci, Si] and the 
signature (KRi [H(Si)]) and verifies the signature.  
4. If the signature is accepted as valid. Then, the 
CA extracts a biometric template (i.e. XTi) from 
biometric sample and proceeds with the 
matching process, and the CA releases the 
X.509v3 digital certificate to the cardholder. 
 
PART 1: The Cardholder 
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PART 2: Certificate Authority (CA) 
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 DSA Using RSA Approach 
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H: = SHA-1 [H (Si)]
Matching Process 1 (CA matches 
the decrypted signature and 


















3.2 Required Components 
The cryptographic-biometric related components 
required by the proposed mechanism when applied to 
the existing SET system. Particularly to the 




• Input device or sensor (at the cardholder PC.) 
• Database storage device (at the CA, if needed.) 
 
Software 
• Program for capturing and signing the biometric 
samples, implementation of the DSA (at the 
cardholder PC) 
• Program for verifying the signature, the other 
part of the DSA (at The CA) 
• Program for extracting the biometric templates 
(at The CA) 
• Program for preparing the biometric templates 
for matching process, implementation of triple 
DES (at The CA) 
• Program for matching the biometric templates (at 
The CA) 
• Database system, maintains the enrollment, 
modification, deletion, and storing of the 
encrypted biometric templates of authorized 
cardholders (at The CA) 
 
The input device can be a video camera, a fingerprint 
scanner, a special signature pen or tablet, or a 
microphone that reads the biometric sample from the 
cardholders and converts it to a form suitable for 
processing. 
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The DSS approach takes a similar approach of using 
a hash function, however the hash code is provided as 
input to a signature function along with a random K 
generated for this particular signature. The signature 
function depends on the cardholder’s private key 
(KRi) and a set of parameters known to a group of 
communicating principle. We can consider this set to 
constitute the CA public key (KUca). The result is a 
signature consisting of two components labeled S and 
R (global public-key components.) 
 
If the signature is valid, the CA matches the extracted 
biometric template with the biometric template of 
authorized cardholder, which is already stored in the 
central database.  The database system manages the 
stored biometric information. It arranges the addition, 
deletion and retrieval of enrolled templates. The data 
stored for each cardholder is the encrypted 
cardholder’s template, the cardholder ID, and other 
information that might be needed. 
 
4.0 DISCUSSION AND GENERAL APPRAISAL 
Security Requirements 
One of the most important attacks is an injection of 
false or replayed biometric data (samples or 
templates). An attacker may attempt to subvert 
security by capturing biometric data that is later 
injected into the system through fake, system-
attached, or biometric capture device (masquerade). 
The use of DSA will protect the integrity of biometric 
data from a possible replay of tapped and intercepted 
biometric data; semantically it will prevent the non-
repudiation attack.  Biometric templates are 
encrypted using a symmetric algorithm (e.g. triple 
DES or AES) to prevent it from unauthorized 
disclosure. Three-key triple DES has an effective key 
length of 168 bits, which made it preferable for many 
Internet applications, including PGP and S/MIME. 
 
Finally, the database system must ensure that the 
enrollment process of biometric information is well 
defined and controlled to prevent the registration of 
individuals using false identities. Addition, deletions, 
modifications, and retrieval processes must be well 
defined and operate in efficient, secured, and 
controlled way. Access to the biometric information 
templates must be restricted.  
 
Security Analysis 
Biometric identifiers can be stronger than passwords 
and token-based authentication methods, as it 
provides a unique enough and reasonable “proof” of 
identity. Mainly, the strength of the mechanism 
comes from the cryptographic algorithms used. 
 
Generally, authentication is a very important concept 
used to verify the identity claimed by a user. 
Nowadays, many critical security services especially 
in e-commerce environment are dependant on 
authenticating users. For instance, authentication is 
required for non-repudiation in communications, and 
in the same time the proof of identity “you are you”. 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) can be used as an 
authentication technique that includes a measure to 
counter masquerade attack (insertion of biometric 
samples into the system from a fraudulent source) and 
also to counter repudiation attack (denial of 
transmission of biometric samples by the legitimate 
cardholder). DSA can be applied by using RSA 
approach to provide authentication or DSS approach 
to provide both confidentiality and authentication of 
transmission data. The DSA is based on the difficulty 
of computing discrete logarithm [1] and based on 
schemes originally by ELGamal and Schnorr[6].  
 
Confidentiality of biometric information is the 
process used to protect secret information from 
unauthorized disclosure attack or controlling the 
access. A symmetric algorithm (e.g. Triple DES or 
AES) can be used to meet this security requirement. 
The default strengths of the symmetric algorithm are 
the fast encryption and decryption feature and the 
reasonable cipher text size. Moreover, the strength of 
three-key triple DES algorithm, with a key length of 
168 bits, there are 2168 possible keys, so a brute-force 
attack appears impractical. Triple DES used here to 
encrypt/decrypt the stored biometric templates of 
authorized cardholders. 
 
In biometric system, there are two types of errors that 
can result from the use of biometrics characteristics 
we need to mention them in this analysis section. The 
first type of error is false positive (false match) where 
an individual is erroneously authenticated. The 
second type is false negative (non false match) where 
a valid user is erroneously rejected. The main causes 
of such errors can be related to input devices and 
unskilled users. Errors related to input devices occur 
when the obtained biometric sample is not accurate 
enough, causing change/closeness problem of 
biometric information. Most of these issues have been 
dealt with the technology development in 
manufacturing the input devices and deployed of the 
biometric technologies; users are gaining experience 
and confidence in biometric systems [7].  
 
5.0 RELATED WORK  
 
There are numerous articles and papers written about 
SET. Many of them provide background, analysis, 
and studies on issues such as survey of SET, SET 
products, SET Internet based payment system, and 
other related issues about SET and it’s involvement in 
Internet-commerce [5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. According to 
my best knowledge, not many articles discuss 
security issues related to SET and evaluation of its 
performance. This could be related to the fact that 
SET is relatively new, and not much research have 
been focused on security issues related to SET. As 
with the biometric technology, there are many papers 
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written about this subject. Biometric technology is 
relatively developed and matured, and many 
biometrics research publications are already available 
[5, 13, 14, 15, 16]. However, most of the researches 





A simple, practical and secured mechanism for 
authentication is presented. A cryptographic-
biometric mechanism is proposed to offer a more 
secure and suitable method for 
authentication/verification of the SET participant 
identity to receive an X.509v3 digital certificate from 
CA. The architecture of this mechanism is designed 
to work over an open network. Necessary 
components and security requirements of such a 
mechanism are described so that it can be applied to 
the existing SET system. Analytical results when 
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